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**AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980**

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (29 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 681194

6 May 1968

AD390021

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st  
Military Intelligence Battalion, Period Ending 31  
January 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARSP)  
APO San Francisco 96307

AVIH-AOPN

15 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968  
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DH  
APO 96375

(U) The following report is submitted in accordance with USARV Regulation 1-19, 8 February 1967.

**SECTION 1**

**SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES**

1. (U) The organizational structure of the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) is indicated at inclosure 1. The Battalion and its four lettered Detachments are organized under TOE 30-5D, 30-6D, 30-7, MTOE USARPAC 1/67, and USARPAC General Orders Number 245, 13 November 1967. The 45th Military Intelligence Detachment (ARS) assigned to this Battalion by USARV General Orders Number 6292, 6 December 1967, is organized under TOE 30-7D, MTOE 30-7D, USCONARC 1/68, and USARPAC General Orders Number 44, 23 January 1968.

2. (U) On 20 November 1967, by USARPAC General Orders Number 245, CS, the Battalion (except the 45th Military Intelligence Detachment) was reorganized under MTOE 30-6D and 30-7D, USARPAC 1/67. These MTOEs were an administrative up-date of the previous MTOEs, USARPAC 1/66. No personnel changes were involved. However, three previously authorized items of equipment were deleted, as they were commercial items and had not been assigned line item numbers as Army adopted items of materiel. The equipment involved are Richards light tables, Models 918 and 940, and Fairchild viewer-printers, Models F512. Action is being taken to obtain authorization for this equipment by TDA/MTDA.

3. (U) The Battalion was engaged in direct and general combat support operations in the performance of its mission in the Republic of Vietnam during the entire reporting period, a total of 92 days.

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4. (U) The following changes in command occurred during the reporting period:

a. LTC J.G. Wetherill assumed command of the Battalion from LTC Anthony F. Matta on 2 January 1968.

b. CPT Charles W. Edgette assumed command of Detachment A from MAJ Charles F. Scanlon on 31 October 1967.

c. MAJ Fadlo M. Massabni assumed command of Detachment C from MAJ John J. Mayers on 1 November 1967.

d. CPT Joseph S. King assumed command of Detachment D from MAJ Peter H. Geiger on 10 November 1967.

5. (U) The following changes in key personnel occurred during the reporting period:

a. CPT Alonzo H. Robinson became the S1, replacing 1LT Karl S. Halter.

b. 2LT Norman P. Bruneau became the S4, replacing MAJ Harold D. Yawberg.

6. (U) On 15 November 1967, the Battalion received the formal results of the annual IG inspection, which had been conducted during the previous reporting period. The Battalion received an overall rating of satisfactory on the inspection (based on a satisfactory-unsatisfactory rating scale).

7. (C) On 30 January 1968, one U-6A Beaver aircraft assigned to the Battalion was severely damaged during a mortar attack on the Marble Mountain Airfield at Da Nang. The damage was so extensive that the airplane has been declared a combat loss.

8. (C) The primary mission, that of providing tactical interpretation, reproduction, and aerial delivery of imagery and related materials resulting from tactical air reconnaissance operations within the Republic of Vietnam, was successfully accomplished during the reporting period. Support has been rendered to ARVN, ROK, Australian, and Thai units, as well as to US ground, air and naval elements throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones. Significant operational statistics and illustrative examples of the numerous types of regular and special support provided by MIBARS to requesting units are presented below.

a. QUARTERLY PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 1967 - 31 JANUARY 1968

(1) MIBARS Detachments:

Nr of targets interpreted - 2,411

Nr of II Reports - 1,983

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Nr of prints interpreted - 402,055

Nr of items reported - 6,383

Nr of mosaics constructed - 114

Ft of photo paper processed - 698,042

Nr of aircraft sorties - 1,670

Pounds of cargo hauled - 42,182  
(aerial deliveries)

Requests for aerial imagery filled with photography on file

HHC, MIBARS (TASE) - 27

MIBARS Detachments - 446

(2) Combined II Sections (Army/Air Force) at Tan Son Nhut and  
Phu Cat:

Nr of targets interpreted - 4,386

Nr of II Reports - 2,093

b. MIBARS personnel were provided to other units upon request to provide instruction in hand-held camera and 35mm film processing techniques; to assist in familiarization with the aerial reconnaissance system and to perform interpretation of imagery resulting from hand-held camera programs. This has been especially helpful to units newly arrived in the Republic of Vietnam which are unfamiliar with the advantages to be derived from this program.

c. Hand-held photography (35mm) was taken, processed, and disseminated by MIBARS in support of numerous requesting units throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) for operational planning, targeting, interrogation, and other purposes.

d. During the reporting period numerous special studies and mosaics were prepared for use in offensive operations, defensive planning, engineer surveys, and other purposes by various requesting units.

e. Tactical Exploitation Teams were provided upon request to support tactical units in particular operations. The teams consist of skilled imagery interpretation and photographic reproduction personnel who can develop intelligence responsively from hand-held photography in a fast-moving operational situation.

f. The Battalion continued to provide informal logistical assistance (photographic equipment and expendable supplies) to requesting units to aid in the implementation of organic hand-held camera programs.

g. MIBARS continued to be available for the operational testing of equipment and techniques related to the aerial reconnaissance effort in Vietnam.

9. (C) Operations of the Headquarters II Section continue to be fully integrated with those of the Photo Processing and Interpretation Facility (PPIF)

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of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Tan Son Nhut. The II Section of the 45th MID and the PPIF of the 460th TRW Operational Location AA (OLAA) at Phu Cat are similarly integrated. Immediate photo readout and Hot and Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports (HOPIRs and IPIRs) are produced by these joint sections on all imagery resulting from reconnaissance missions of 460th TRW aircraft. The types of imagery interpreted include photo, infrared, and SLAR (in-country only). The primary purpose of these sections' operations is to provide a "soon as possible" report of significant indications of enemy activity and of findings in answer to the Essential Elements of Information (EEI) stated by the commander who requested the mission. A Hot Report of particularly significant findings is made immediately by telephone to the intelligence officer of the command primarily concerned. The subsequent Immediate Reports are transmitted by IMMEDIATE teletype message, via the MACV Command Operations Center dedicated net, to the appropriate Field Force or Corps headquarters. A diapositive and duplicate negative are subsequently produced and forwarded to the appropriate MIBARS detachment for further and more detailed interpretation and reporting (Supplemental Photo Interpretation Reports - SUPIRs) on photo missions only.

10. (C) The lack of adequate communications is a continuing problem, adversely affecting the conduct of the Battalion's operations. The Headquarters Imagery Interpretation Section has access to the MACV Command Operations Center dedicated teletype net, as mentioned in para 9 above. However, access to this net is granted only for the transmission of Immediate Reports. Even so, excessive delays are sometimes encountered between the time that a report is delivered to the communications center and the time that the message is received at its destination. For other communications requirements, the Battalion is entirely dependent on common user telephone circuits, common user teletype nets, and couriers. These communications are inadequate to provide the necessary command and control of the Battalion's operations on a responsive basis or even to provide the units of the Battalion with local communications during enemy attacks. Under the best of conditions, communication by common user telephone with the distant Detachments or other headquarters is a time-consuming and unsatisfactory process. The use of teletype is unresponsive for operational matters having a precedence of less than IMMEDIATE, due to the heavy volume of message traffic. This limitation is further aggravated by the current imposition of MINIMIZE controls. Use of couriers is restricted to special, high-priority requirements, and there are times, as in the midst of battle, when it is not possible to use a courier. Since 1966, this Headquarters has sought to have established a dedicated teletype net that would connect the Battalion Headquarters, the IPIR Section at Tan Son Nhut, the MIBARS Detachments, and the Corps/Field Force Headquarters. This dedicated teletype net would provide the necessary command and control over MIBARS operations and would permit maximum responsiveness in the dissemination of the Immediate Reports. To this date, the requested net has not been established. If the dedicated teletype net cannot be provided, then "hot line" telephone or voice radio communications must be made available. To meet the requirement for local communications by the units of this Battalion, especially during emergency situations, a request for an emergency MTOE has been submitted to Headquarters, USARV, requesting one AN/VRC-46 and one AN/VRC-47 radio for each Detachment. Two AN/VRC-46 radios and an AN/VRC-47 were requested for the Headquarters. These radios are particularly required for communication when the

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Telephone circuits are out, as they have been during periods of enemy attack. The need for additional communications in this Battalion is urgent; an early solution must be found to correct the existing deficiencies in communications.

11. (C) The MIBARS Detachments or HHC TASE Element can provide any requesting unit with the information of whether an area in Vietnam has had reconnaissance flown over it. In addition, reprints of these prior coverage missions can be provided on request. The prints are delivered to the units (down to division/separate brigade level) by the Headquarters Delivery Platoon, which is presently equipped with eight U-6A Beaver aircraft (eight authorized). However, one of the assigned aircraft is the combat loss discussed in para 7, above.

12. (C) On 22 January 1968, Project Niagra was initiated under the auspices of the 6470th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (USAF). The project pertains to imagery flown in support of operations around the Khe Sanh Marine Base. The Headquarters II Section, as part of its normal operations, has been supporting Project Niagra by plotting mission coverage traces on each target and by rendering Hot and Immediate reports. Thus far, 1st MIBARS has not been tasked to supply imagery interpreters to the Project Niagra interpretation team, as in the case of Project Neutralize in the third quarter of 1967.

13. (U) During the reporting period, the Battalion adopted a new operational SOP for the receipt, handling, and reporting of imagery. The SOP is equally applicable to USAF, RVNAF, Army Mohawk, and hand-held photography. The principal features of this SOP include the requirement to prepare a Supplemental Photo Interpretation Report (SUPIR) on all aerial photography received. If significant new intelligence is found, a telephonic report will be made ASAP to the requesting unit. The intelligence derived from the imagery is plotted initially as a map overlay and then is written up into a hard copy SUPIR. An objective was established of dispatching the overlay to the requesting unit within 24 hours of the time that the photography was received at the Detachment. The hard copy follows within a maximum of 72 hours after the time the photography was received. Each Detachment is required to maintain a data base of its supported Corps Tactical Zone which is to be reproduced and distributed quarterly. As a minimum, the data base is kept as a series of overlays to 1:50,000 map sheets. The data base document can be more elaborate, as discussed in para 14 below. The overall effect of these new procedures has been to reduce to a minimum the time lapsed between the receipt of the photography and the dispatch of some form of the interpretation report. The principal emphasis remains, however, on providing supported units with a thorough interpretation report of the highest quality.

14. (C) In the past quarter, Detachment A continued its program of plotting all indications of activity, defenses, and installations interpreted from imagery flown within the IIICTZ to produce its reference data base document. This document is composed of 1:50,000 map sheets reproduced from Cronaflex masters, covering the entire III CTZ, with adjoining reference data consisting of item number, mission number, target number, mission data, coordinates, Detachment film library number, and description of sighting.

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An innovation in the latest document, dated 1 January 1968, is that the data base items are overprinted in red, rather than in black, to lend both vividness and ease of identification to the presentation. With this graphic and reference information, requestors can examine specific areas of interest, noting all activity occurring within a three month period, by date of sighting, and if desired, can request reprints of specific missions by film library number. Distribution is to all supported units throughout III Corps Tactical Zone and to selected MACV and CONUS agencies.

15. (C) In December and January, Detachment B was requested by the Hoi An Sub-Sector S2 to provide hand-held photos of an approximate scale of 1:1000 of hamlets in the Hoi An area for use in operations against the VC infrastructure. Instead of searching for VC by name in a hamlet, individual houses are annotated on photography where the known VC were located. Debriefing of sources is accomplished with the assistance of photography. The police then simply go directly to the houses and arrest the inhabitants. This technique proved highly successful and Detachment B was tasked to photograph 130 hamlets in the Hoi An Sub-Sector. Most of the photography was accomplished during low overcast weather conditions which precluded other types of reconnaissance aircraft from obtaining this coverage. The project extended over a ten day period, utilizing an O-1 Bird Dog aircraft furnished by the 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company. There are currently similar requirements in direct support of this effort in other sectors which will be accomplished on a continuing basis. Favorable results with the Hoi An project have become well known and evaluation of this new application of hand-held photography is currently in progress for possible further implementation in other areas.

16. (U) Detachment C initiated a target folder program during the past quarter, as an effort to provide an additional usable intelligence product to assist supported US and ARVN tactical units in operational planning. The targets are developed through identification of significant areas of enemy activity from USAF and RVNAF photography. Further exploitation is obtained by hand-held photography over the area of interest, as required. The result is a compact, graphic portrayal of selected areas of enemy activity.

17. (C) During the reporting period, Detachment D provided Tactical Exploitation Team support to Company B, 5th Special Forces Group and ICEX operations in Kontum Province. Support to Special Forces consisted of two personnel operating from Pleiku between 11 and 16 December 1967. The team photographed sites for two new Special Forces camps. Photographs were also taken of present camps for defensive planning purposes and of several villages for future operations planning. A total of five missions were flown, covering 21 targets. A one-man team went to Kontum between 19 and 28 December 1967 to support ICEX operations. Photographs were taken of villages in Kontum Province for future operations planning. Annotated prints were used by the team member to brief the Senior Province Advisor, the Sector Advisor, and ICEX personnel. One mission was flown, covering 39 targets.

18. (C) During the reporting period, Detachment D developed a new concept in hand-held photography, in cooperation with the 183rd Reconnaissance

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Airplane Company (RAC), which flies O-1 Bird Dog aircraft in reconnaissance support of ARVN military operations in Khanh Hoa Province. This concept consists of sending a hand-held photographer on a reconnaissance flight without assigning predetermined targets. The mission is to photograph enemy activity discovered visually in the course of the flight. The photographs are then used to substantiate the pilots' claims of enemy activity observed. This cooperation between the two units holds advantages for both; MIBARE personnel, by flying over the given area on a daily basis, are given the opportunity to become extremely familiar with that area. RAC personnel are provided with a permanent record to support their reports of observations.

19. (C) On 21 November 1967, the 45th Military Intelligence Detachment (ARS) arrived in-country and was assigned to 1st MTBARS. The location of the Detachment at Phu Cat Air Base, instead of at Pleiku, had been approved by COMUSMACV. The imagery interpreters of the 45th MI Detachment were integrated into the operations of the PPIF of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Operational Location AA, at Phu Cat. The Detachment assists in producing Hot and Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports from the Air Force reconnaissance missions terminated at Phu Cat. Operations are similar to those of the Headquarters II Section, discussed in para 9 above. At the time that the 45th MI Detachment was located at Phu Cat, it was anticipated that the 460th TRW would relocate one tactical reconnaissance squadron to Phu Cat. The turn-around program of terminating reconnaissance flights over I Corps and northern II Corps was begun on 3 September 1967 on an experimental basis, to evaluate the decentralization concept. This turn-around procedure permitted each aircraft the capability of flying additional targets in the northern part of the Republic of Vietnam and of spending an additional 30 minutes over these target areas. Although the turn-around program was effective, even though operated on a limited basis, the Commander, Seventh Air Force, decided in December that a squadron would not be relocated to Phu Cat. At the same time, the limited turn-around program was to be continued on an indefinite and uncertain basis. There has been a slight increase in the number of flights terminated at Phu Cat each day. Although other considerations are involved, there is no question that decentralization of at least two tactical reconnaissance squadrons into I Corps and II Corps would significantly improve the responsiveness of the aerial reconnaissance system in Vietnam. In keeping with its present limited mission at Phu Cat, the 45th MI Detachment has been reduced to approximately 50% of its authorized strength. The remaining personnel were reassigned to other elements of the Battalion in accordance with operational needs.

20. (U) The Battalion is continuing its program of designing and implementing courses of instruction to assist personnel in accomplishing their duties in support of the aerial reconnaissance effort in Vietnam. The In-Country Imagery Interpretation Course (IIIC) is being constantly revised to meet the needs of all participating units. Instructor support is obtained from CICV, 460th TRW, and Compass Eagle for special blocks of instruction. An objective has been established, however, to teach as much of the course as possible in-house. The course serves the primary purpose of acquainting

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newly arrived personnel with Vietnam imagery and shortening the "break-in period" of 60-90 days, which has previously been the time required for a new II to learn on his own the unique features of the area. During the reporting period 5 IIIC courses were given, 55 students having received the training. The course has been received favorably by those personnel having attended it. In addition, the MIBARS School continues a regularly scheduled G2 Air Course which provides a basic working knowledge of the Aerial Reconnaissance System, as it is designed and functions in Vietnam, to the many personnel performing G2/S2 Air duties who have had little or no prior G2 Air experience. During the reporting period, 3 G2 Air Courses were given, 34 students having received training. Courses on the ES-38 and the Tactical Imagery Interpretation Facility (TIIF) are given when requested by units for their personnel. The ES-38 Course provides photographic personnel with a knowledge of organizational maintenance and repair techniques related to the ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group and the equipment contained therein. One ES-38 organizational maintenance course was held during the reporting period, 6 students having received training. A special two week course in direct and general support maintenance procedures on the ES-38 was given during the reporting period. The purpose of the special course was to train maintenance personnel of support units of the 1st Logistical Command, which has been assigned higher echelon maintenance responsibility for the ES-38. Ten personnel attended this special course. The TIIF Course provides a course of instruction on the TIIF and its components. The ES-38 Course and TIIF Course are presented by manufacturers' technical representatives in MIBARS facilities, under the auspices of the Battalion. Special instruction was also provided during the last quarter to ICEX personnel on 1st MIBARS and the Hand-Held Camera Program. The MIBARS School fills an important gap in turning the newly arrived personnel into proficient technicians in the counterinsurgency environment in Vietnam. The role of the School is becoming greater as various units are made aware of the advantages of having personnel attend. A quota arrangement has recently been established for the IIIC Course by Headquarters, USARV, for Army Units, which greatly facilitates the scheduling of courses. In addition, this increases the degree of the commanders' awareness of the facilities available for the training of their personnel.

21. (U) Between 11 and 23 December 1967, Detachment B conducted an aerial observer school. It had previously been recognized that there was a critical need for a training program for aerial observers in I Corps. In November a proposed program of instruction was published and distributed to the organizations involved, among which were the I Corps G2 Advisor, MAG 16 (USMC), and the 220th Reconnaissance Airplane Company. Instructors were provided by each of these organizations and Detachment B. All programmed instructional periods were completed with the exception of the flying skill phase, aircraft communications (in-flight) phase and calling for and adjusting artillery strikes. These phases of the program will be completed as weather, availability of aircraft, and enemy activity permit. A total of seven personnel were trained in the school.

22. (U) As part of the support to the Hand-Held Camera Program, the MIBARS Detachments provide briefings and/or instruction to personnel of supported units in each of the CTZ. The instruction covers the basic techniques of identification, basic camera operating procedures, techniques of hand-held

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photography, target location and identification, and basic processing procedures. This instruction has proven a great aid in the development of organic programs by supported units to enhance their quick reaction intelligence gathering capabilities.

23. (C) During the reporting period, 1st MIBARS continued its field evaluation of new photographic equipment and processes provided by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Office of the Secretary of Defense, as part of Project CESARO. MIBARS was tasked to evaluate, or as test manager, to supervise the evaluation of, the following equipment: Dynalens stabilized 2½ - to - 12 power zoom binoculars; Dynalens stabilized Nikon F 35mm camera with 500mm and 1000mm telephoto lenses; modified Asahi Pentax 35mm camera with 200mm telephoto lens and Nikon F 35mm camera with 500mm telephoto lens, from which projected color images can be obtained from black and white positive transparencies (black and white to color system); and a laser night photo system, consisting of a starlight scope for targeting, a pulsed laser for illumination of the target, and a Nikon F 35mm camera with 500mm telephoto lens to record the image. MIBARS is also evaluating GC-514 developer, an extended dynamic range process, which is designed to produce an image from which usable information can be extracted from the bright and dark areas. The initial phase of the evaluation of the equipment was completed on 9 December 1967 and the initial evaluation report was published on 18 December 1967. Preliminary findings on the binoculars, the black and white to color system, and the extended dynamic range developing process warranted continued evaluation. The Dynalens stabilized camera system, using the 500mm telephoto lens, was found to be incapable of producing consistently satisfactory photographs for interpretation purposes. However, at the request of ARPA, additional photography was taken on 28 January 1968 to permit further evaluation of the system. A final report on the 500mm camera system will be published on 1 March 1968. The 1000mm camera system has not yet been evaluated, as it was only recently turned over to 1st MIBARS. The laser night photo system was found to produce excellent night photographs at ranges up to 5,700 feet. However, the equipment does not have sufficient range for many applications, could not be oriented at night under conditions of heavy overcast, and was not durable enough to withstand operating conditions in Vietnam. Further, the potential safety hazards of the equipment had not been given sufficient consideration. Evaluation of the laser night photo system has been completed.

24. (C) The Battalion Special Projects Photographic Team and Detachment personnel continued field test and evaluation programs to develop more sophisticated techniques to enhance the capabilities of the Hand-Held (35mm) Camera Program. The testing includes the use of various lenses and combination of lenses/cameras and film processing methods to obtain a product of even greater quality than has been obtained up to now for the derivation of intelligence. These programs are conducted in addition to such specialized projects as Project CESARO.

25. (U) The ES-38 reproduction facility continued to be a source of problems during the past quarter, as it had been previously. The floors and sides of the shelter continued to deteriorate, due to the climate and continuous operation of the facility. In addition, it has been found that the increased workload in conventional photography and hand-held imagery has

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made the ES-38 less than adequate for operational needs. This is especially true of the processing of 35mm imagery, which is not readily processed with the equipment in the ES-38. The Battalion has submitted a request to retain its present ES-38s, in addition to the new ES-38Bs, which are now programmed for delivery to this unit on or about 31 March 1968. The presence of the additional ES-38s will alleviate the workload on the present facilities and also make more down time available to properly maintain and protect the facilities from deterioration and excessive operational wear. The requirement for a second ES-38 in each Reproduction Section in the Battalion is reflected in MTOEs to be submitted to HQ USARV in the near future.

26. (U) The Battalion continues its program of gathering materials to supplement the MIBARS In-Country Imagery Interpretation Key, as part of the constant effort to up-date and provide the latest in intelligence reference material in support of the reconnaissance effort. The key has proven to be most valuable as part of the POI at the MIBARS School IIIC Course and also to the imagery interpretation personnel engaged in operational activities in the Republic of Vietnam. The Key has also been reproduced and is being used by the US Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, in the training of new imagery interpreters.

27. (U) The MIBARS Aerial Observer Handbook and Hand-Held Camera Guide was assembled and prepared for printing during the past quarter. The guide is now being printed and should be ready for distribution by 1 March 1968. This publication will be an authoritative reference for hand-held photographers and aerial observers based on the experience derived from Battalion participation in the reconnaissance effort in Vietnam. In addition to the text, the handbook includes actual hand-held photos to guide the individual engaged in this field on what to look for and how to record it on film. It should prove to be an invaluable aid for training and operational purposes in the expanding field of hand-held photography.

28. (U) The Battalion is continuing its program of supplying imagery, II reports and related training materials to various CONUS agencies. Copies of the In-Country Imagery Interpretation Key and MIBARS Information Booklet are also supplied upon request. Actual RVN imagery and associated reports provide valuable training material for use both at USAINTS, Fort Holabird, and by units engaged in training in CONUS. During the reporting period, training materials were sent for the first time to the Royal Australian Army Photographic Interpretation School, in Australia.

29. (U) The Battalion has continued its civic action program by means of donations of food, clothing, toys, scrap lumber, and money to the Don Bosco and Go Vap Orphanages in Gia Dinh Province, the Can Tho Orphange, and the Vinh Son Orphange in Nha Trang. Christmas parties were held by various units of the Battalion for these orphanages. During the Christmas season, a group of Vietnamese students in Can Tho was organized into a choir which gave several concerts of traditional Vietnamese and American carols. The Don Bosco Orphange has been further assisted by repairs on its 40 passenger bus and in the training and coaching of its boys in basketball and softball. Members of the Battalion have continued to teach English to night school classes organized by the Can Tho Vietnamese-American Association.

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SECTION 2

COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I

OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

30. (U) Personnel. None.

31. (C) Operations.

Air Force Tactical Reconnaissance Effort

Item: Decentralization of Air Force tactical reconnaissance squadrons from Tan Son Nhut Air Base.

Discussion: As the aerial reconnaissance system now functions, all Air Force tactical reconnaissance aircraft are located at Tan Son Nhut. As a result, all in-country reconnaissance missions flown by the Air Force must be flown out of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, regardless in which CTZ the actual target may be. This situation has a detrimental effect on the timely distribution of imagery and related documents (traces and immediate reports) from these missions to the MIBARS Detachment and the requesting unit in the targeted CTZ. Consequently, the intelligence derived from these missions does not reach the requestor on a timely basis. An example of this delay is at Detachment B, located in Da Nang (I CTZ), four hundred miles from Tan Son Nhut. The Air Force courier flights deliver missions to Detachment B from Saigon every 12 hours. A high priority mission could thus be needlessly delayed up to 12 hours. Many units hesitate to request Air Force reconnaissance missions due to the time lapse between the request for aerial imagery and the receipt of the intelligence report. This is unfortunate, as Air Force photography would, in many instances, provide valuable immediate tactical intelligence, if it could be disseminated responsively.

Observation: A relocation of Air Force reconnaissance assets to I and II CTZ would not only be the solution to the time lapse problem but also in keeping with established tactical reconnaissance doctrine, which calls for a MIBARS Detachment supporting a tactical reconnaissance squadron in each of the Corps Zones. This system would be much more responsive to the intelligence needs of the tactical commanders than is the present system.

Multiple Coverage Interpretation

Item: Simultaneous Use of Different Films and Infrared Coverage

Discussion: During the reporting period, Detachment D gained considerable experience in interpreting imagery taken simultaneously from different camera positions on the same aircraft. Multiple coverage missions received to date have consisted of the following sensor and film combinations:

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<u>Sensor</u>	<u>Camera Position</u>	<u>Film / System</u>
KA-56A	Low Panoramic	Camouflage Detection
KS-72	Vertical	Color
KS-72	Vertical	Camouflage Detection
AN/AAS-18		Infrared

(1) No black and white conventional photography was programmed for these missions. Color and camouflage detection film are excellent supplements to black and white, but the latter type of imagery is needed to provide a basis for interpretation. Black and white photography provides better resolution for detailed interpretation and interpreters are more familiar with it.

(2) Color and camouflage detection imagery both have qualities which enhance the interpretations that can be made from the basic black and white film. Color gives the interpreter a view of the terrain similar to that obtained by visual observation. Attention is often attracted to a given area because of a color difference that is not apparent on black and white photography. The same is true of camouflage detection film, insofar as its characteristics attract the eye to areas which may otherwise have been overlooked. The use of all three types of imagery provides the interpreter with the maximum capability to analyze the target completely and to extract all items of significance.

(3) In this period, Detachment D did not receive the infrared imagery flown concurrently with the color and CD photography. The infrared coverage aids in plotting the photography. It is at a smaller scale and covers a greater area, and thus is likely to have recorded a greater number of recognizable terrain and man-made features. Color and CD photography are extremely difficult to plot when flown in forested or mountainous areas that afford little detail. Since the IR mission is plotted and interpreted at the PPIF at Tan Son Nhut, it has not been the practice to forward any IR imagery to the MIBARS Detachments. However, selected IR imagery would be of value to interpreters in the MIBARS Detachments to provide general orientation of other imagery, as well as to give the interpreter the opportunity to isolate areas of interest which may be studied more thoroughly on the other types of imagery.

(4) The type of camera used with a given type of film also has a bearing on the success of multiple coverage interpretation. CD film taken with the low panoramic KA-56A camera is not as satisfactory for interpretation as that taken with the KS-72 camera (Little Looker). On low pan imagery, distortion in the outer edges limits interpretation to the center of the frame, even with black and white photography. This inherent problem is accentuated when CD film is used, and the value in using the film is decreased.

(5) Color film taken with the KS-72 camera has been received with practically no overlap between frames. The camera should be set to obtain the standard 60 per cent overlap. The camera provides excellent resolution and stereo viewing is necessary to take full advantage of the camera's capabilities.

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(6) From the experience gained to date, it appears that the following configuration of sensors, using the RF-4C aircraft, will provide optimum results:

<u>Sensor</u>	<u>Camera Position</u>	<u>Focal Length</u>	<u>Film/System</u>
KA-56A	Low Panoramic	3"	Black and White
KS-72	Nose Vertical	3"	Camouflage Detection
KS-72	Split Vertical	6"	Color
AN/AAS-18			Infrared

(7) It is recognized that color and CD film is costly to purchase and process and that the in-country processing capability is relatively limited. However, when used for certain selected critical missions, the additional intelligence that may be derived from multiple coverage provides more than sufficient justification for the expense involved. It is essential that multiple coverage missions be well planned to take maximum advantage of the capabilities available.

Observation: Provision of selected IR imagery to MIBARS Detachments is expected to assist imagery interpreters in the interpretation of conventional photography. Use of multiple coverage imagery will yield maximum intelligence from aerial reconnaissance of selected target areas.

#### Evaluation of Developmental Equipment

Item: Conduct of Equipment Evaluation Programs in Vietnam

Discussion: During the reporting period, 1st MI Bn (ARS) participated in the evaluation of developmental photographic equipment and processes as part of Project CESARO. Several problems were encountered in the conduct of this evaluation program.

(1) Insufficient information regarding the nature of the equipment was provided to the ARPA Field Unit and the test managers in Vietnam. This lack of information, regarding such matters as size, weight, and electrical power requirements of equipment and temperature control requirements for photographic processing, precluded effective preliminary planning for the evaluation program. When the equipment arrived, it was quickly discovered that considerably different logistical support would be required, than had been originally envisioned.

(2) In the preliminary planning, this Headquarters had been given the understanding that it was responsible for establishing the location in which the evaluation was to be conducted and the procedures to be followed. When the Project Chief, Mr. R.S. Cesaro (of ARPA, OSD) arrived in-country, however, it was evident that he had developed preconceived ideas of how the evaluation was to be conducted and at what location. No prior operational or logistical plans had been made to support Mr. Cesaro's desires, although they could have been, had sufficient advance notice been given. In the initial phase of the evaluation, Mr. Cesaro wanted to use US personnel and equipment as photographic targets. CONUS is the appropriate location for demon-

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strating the capabilities of the equipment in detecting friendly personnel and equipment. The developmental equipment has no value in the counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam, unless it can be used successfully against indigenous targets.

(3) Once the Project Team had arrived in-country, impossibly short time frames were imposed for requirements which demanded considerable coordination. Further, conflicting instructions were given local project personnel by representatives of the different activities involved. It was not until a reasonable program for conduct of the evaluation was worked out and a clear chain of authority established that substantial progress was made.

(4) In the course of the evaluation, it became evident that much of the equipment was not living up to the claims of performance that had been made for it. Many of the problems encountered in using the equipment indicated that more thorough testing in CONUS should have been conducted, prior to bringing the equipment to Vietnam for evaluation. In considering evaluations of this type, cognizance must be taken of the potential hazard to test personnel utilizing the equipment in or over hostile territory. It must be determined that the results to be gained warrant the exposure of personnel to these hazards.

Observation: Proper detailed, advance planning and coordination between CONUS R&D agencies and the oversea commands who will participate in the evaluation program will give greater assurance of a responsive and effective program.

#### Hand-Held Photography Support

Item: Increase in the Number of Hand-Held Camera Missions

Discussion: During the reporting period, the Battalion has rendered increased hand-held camera support to requesting units in Vietnam. The value of hand-held photography is widely accepted as a supplement to other aerial imagery, as well as to other intelligence sources. The use of light reconnaissance aircraft in conjunction with hand-held 35mm cameras enables low level unique angle photography to be taken which will reveal camouflaged huts and other structures which would not have been visible on conventional photography. This support has been rendered by actual dispatch of Tactical Exploitation Teams (TET), which consist of highly skilled imagery interpreters and reproduction specialists, supplied on request to a unit for a specific mission. Also, the Battalion has loaned equipment and provided processing support, in addition to providing training to personnel of other units in photographic techniques, to enable these units to implement an organic Hand-Held Camera Program. Due to the time lapse in obtaining results from Air Force imagery, many commanders are requesting hand-held missions and organic Army photography in lieu of Air Force missions. This, in part, is the reason for the noticeable increase in the number of hand-held missions.

Observation: The value of the Hand-Held Camera Program is primarily as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, other sources. When utilized

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as such, the Hand-Held Program provides a considerable amount of intelligence, due to the large scale obtainable and the ability to fly missions even in overcast weather, which would preclude other types of reconnaissance missions. In this vein, the program is being encouraged and expanded to provide quick response/specialized imagery to field commanders. This program cannot and is not intended to replace Air Force imagery.

Use of Aerial Photography to Debrief Intelligence Sources

Item: A new technique of using hand-held photography to debrief agent/informer intelligence sources has been utilized successfully.

Discussion: Detachment B provided hand-held aerial photographs of hamlets in the Hoi An Sub-sector from which agent/informer sources could relate the actual structure in which VC or ARVN equipment or supplies were housed. The police could make arrests by going directly to the suspect building, giving the occupants little or no warning. This method of debriefing has proven highly successful and is being expanded.

Observation: The success of the Hoi An operation suggests further application of this technique and various modified applications to utilize fully all available intelligence sources. Photography offers the debriefing personnel graphic representations of areas to assist in obtaining the desired information.

Standardization of the Hand-Held Camera Program

Item: Army-wide Standardization of Hand-Held Photography

Discussion: The Hand-Held Camera Program in Vietnam has progressed to the stage where it can now be evaluated with regard to possible Army-wide implementation. The achievements of the program should be documented within Department of the Army, so that the program can be readily implemented in other tactical or training situations that may arise. The photographic equipment utilized in the program should be standardized, included in the TOE authorizations of appropriate units, and made available through normal supply channels.

Observation: Recommendations will be presented to ACofS, J2, MACV and to Headquarters, USARV, regarding standardization of hand-held 35mm photography as an Army program.

Date Base Documents

Item: Provision of Data Base Documents to Supported Units

Discussion: Since 1 July 1967, Detachment A has been providing data base documents in a convenient format to requestors in IIT CTZ. These documents enable units to request reprints of missions flown in their TAOR quickly and easily. The document is constantly up-dated by current reports and completely

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republished quarterly to provide timely and usable information. The document was instituted by the other MIBARS Detachments in the last quarter for each of their respective CTZ.

Observation: The data base documents have proven to be of great value for units needing coverage of areas for defensive and offensive planning and various studies. The easy reference enables the requestor to see at a glance the item number, mission number, target number, mission data, coordinates, description of sightings, and the MIBARS Detachment film library number. The reprints are provided on request and provide the commanders with a rapid source of imagery without having to request new missions.

#### Enlargements of Aerial Photography

Item: Limited Enlargement Capability of ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group

Discussion: Only a limited enlargement capability is incorporated into the ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group. The EN-36A enlarger can make enlarged prints from 70mm and 5 inch film, but not from 9 inch film. A means was needed to produce enlarged segments from 9" X 9" and 9" X 18" negatives. Detachment A developed a system of enlarging segments of negatives of these sizes by modifying a standard Lucky enlarger (commercial cost - \$37.00). A movable lens system is used to scan the desired area of the negative. Sections have been enlarged up to ten times without encountering severe grain problems. Enlargements of greater areas of aerial photographs could be accomplished by using a 4" X 5" format camera to photograph the desired areas. The resulting negative could then be projected to whatever size enlargement is required.

Observation: Since enlargement requirements are relatively limited, satisfactory results can be obtained with the modified Lucky enlarger.

#### Utilization of ES-38 Equipment in the Hand-Held Camera Program

Item: Modification of the EN-36A Enlarger to Produce Prints from 35mm Film

Discussion: The production of 8" X 10" enlargements of 35mm negatives is a relatively slow process. Time is required to develop, wash, and dry the prints. However, the EN-36A enlarger of the ES-38 group can be adapted to project images from 35mm film by using components of the standard Lucky enlarger. The metering and exposure regulation system of the EN-36A enlarger can be utilized to adjust the 35mm enlargements. The entire roll of 35mm can be projected onto a 200 foot roll of paper, which can then be processed through the EH-48A processor. In this manner, the prints are developed, washed and dried in a continuous process. It has been noted that the prints obtained by use of this process are of lesser quality than those produced by the normal method, due to lack of proper lens filters. The prints are adequate, however, for interpretation purposes. This method is three to four times faster than the standard process.

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Observation: When high quality prints are not required and speed of processing is essential, the modified EN-36A enlarger can be used to make standard enlargements from 35mm film.

### 32. (U) Training and Organization

#### Organization under Appropriate TOE/MTOE

Item: The 45th Military Intelligence Detachment (ARS) arrived in-country on 21 November 1967; on 23 January 1968, the Detachment was reorganized under MTOE 30-7D, USCONARC 1/68.

Discussion: No prior notification of the USCONARC MTOE was given to this Headquarters. MTOE 30-7D, USCONARC 1/68 differs considerably from MTOE 30-7D, USARPAC 1/67, under which the lettered Detachments of this Battalion are organized. Consequently, a request to reorganize the 45th MI Detachment under the USARPAC MTOE 1/67 has had to be submitted, so that the new Detachment's organization will be consistent with that of the rest of the Battalion.

Observation: The 45th MI Detachment could have been reorganized by an MTOE identical to the USARPAC MTOE, prior to departing CONUS, by liaison between the intended parent organization (this Battalion) and the CONUS major command. This coordination would have facilitated the integration of the new unit into the Battalion.

#### Aerial Observer/Hand-Held Photographer School

Item: The need has arisen for the training of more Aerial Observers/Hand-Held Camera Photographers.

Discussion: Attendant to the increase in the number of hand-held missions requested and flown in Vietnam is the need to train men in the techniques of accomplishing such missions. At present, MIBARS Detachments provide briefing and/or training to personnel of requesting units which are seeking to implement organic hand-held programs. The facilities at the Detachments are limited; nevertheless, maximum support is rendered in this area within the limitations of the facilities and personnel available to give such instruction.

Observation: The MIBARS School is at present studying the feasibility of establishing a POI for Aerial Observers/Hand-Held Camera Photographers at the MIBARS School facilities. Here the instructor personnel and study facilities are available; the central location would afford greater opportunity for the attendance of personnel from outlying units who would probably not otherwise have such instruction available to them.

#### MIBARS Publications

Item: The MIBARS In-Country Imagery Interpretation Key which MIBARS published and distributed over the previous two quarters continues to be in

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demand. On or about 1 March 1968, an Aerial Observer Handbook and Hand-Held Camera Guide will be published.

Discussion: The MIBARS In-Country Imagery Interpretation Key provides a key depicting terrain, cultural features, production, construction, and military activities peculiar to Vietnam. The Key has already been widely distributed and requests continue to be received for additional copies. These requests will be filled so long as copies are available. Work has already begun on a thorough revision to the key. The Aerial Observer Handbook and Hand-Held Camera Guide, which is presently being printed, will fill the need for an authoritative reference on techniques and procedures for personnel functioning as aerial observers and hand-held photographers, based on experience gained in the counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam.

Observation: The MIBARS Key has proven a great success both for training and operational requirements. It is expected that the Aerial Observer Handbook will be equally as useful in its field. MIBARS continues its program to publish and up-date publications which provide heretofore unavailable information and guidance related to the reconnaissance effort in Vietnam.

33. (U) Intelligence. See paragraph 30, Operations.

34. (U) Logistics.

#### AR-85A Viewer Computer

Item: AR-85A Viewer Computer.

Discussion: The viewer computer has very limited use for the type of tactical interpretation being accomplished in Vietnam. An II is seldom required to perform mensuration problems. When he is required to do so, he can easily accomplish this utilizing basic II tools, such as the tube magnifier, boxwood scale, and II slide rule. In addition, the AR-85A viewer computer is a delicate instrument requiring a considerable amount of maintenance which is not readily available. The result has been that the computers have been down more than 50% of the time.

Observation: Due to the limited use of the computer and the lack of maintenance support available for it in RVN, it would be better replaced with an imagery interpretation light table AR-90. This substitution would result in both substantial dollar savings to the government and an increased capability for the II Section.

#### Connecting Passages Between Vans

Item: Connecting Passages Between Imagery Interpretation Vans.

Discussion: At present there is no standardized military equipment designed to be installed as a proper connecting passage between imagery interpretation vans (M292 expandible vans and the AN/TSQ-43 TIIF). In most cases, a wooden

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structure is constructed. When the vans are displaced operationally or merely moved for maintenance purposes, this wooden passage must be dismantled. When being reinstalled, it invariably requires modification. It leaks during the rainy season, hot air enters through the wooden structure and cool air from the air-conditioned vans is lost. During the dry season, dust gets into the vans through these structures. To overcome these problems, a flexible bellows type of connecting passage, of a sturdy rubberized material, could be designed to be mounted between the vans. The passage could be mounted using existing screws around the door frames in the sides of the vans. The exact spacing and alignment of the vans would no longer be so critical, as the flexibility of the bellows would be able to compensate. Sectional steel planking could be used as the floor of the passage.

Observation: Adaption of the suggested connecting passage would afford maximum protection from the elements. The passage could easily be collapsed and stored on top of the van during transport.

#### Reproduction Section Equipment

Item: Utilization of ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group.

Discussion: Due to the increased heavy workload placed on Reproduction Sections within the Battalion, the ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group is being utilized beyond its designed capacity. This has resulted in deterioration and malfunctions because of inability to maintain the facility, due to operational necessity. Little down time is available.

Observation: The Battalion is programmed to receive replacement ES-38s in the near future. It has been requested that the Battalion retain its old ES-38s in addition to the new ones, to allow proper shifting and maintenance of the equipment to preclude use of the equipment greatly in excess of its capacity. The request was approved on a temporary basis by Headquarters, USARV on 6 January 1968.

#### Reproduction Processing Paper

Item: Adaptation of 500 - foot Rolls of Paper to the EH-48A Processors and EN-6A Continuous Contact Printer in the ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group.

Discussion: Upon experiencing an acute shortage of standard 200 - foot rolls of photographic paper (FSN 6750-597-2636) in Vietnam, roll contact paper type 1779 (FSN 6750-664-0327), which is manufactured in 500 and 1000 - foot lengths, was substituted. It was found that the latter type paper produces superior quality with good negatives. The paper dried better than the 200 - foot roll paper. With simple operational modifications, contact printing and processing was accelerated, as the operator did not have to reload his machines every 200 feet.

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Observation: The substitution of the 500 or 1000 - foot rolls can be accomplished on the EH-6A with no modification. The EH-48A will take 500 - foot rolls in the supply reel chamber, but the take-up reel will accomodate only 250 feet. This only means that the take-up reel must be changed while the machine is operating. Thus, the shortage of the 200 - foot reels of paper can be overcome by substituting the larger rolls of a slightly different type.

EH-48 Processor in ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Group

Item: Improvements to the EH-48 Processor

Discussion: The following areas require improvement on the EH-48 processor, as noted:

(1) Tighteners for flanges inside processor cassettes should have larger tightening heads. Present tighteners cannot be tightened properly and the heads break off easily, resulting in a deadlined unit.

(2) A more permanent counterweight for lifting the processor head should be designed. The present mechanism is inadequate, is unable to be properly serviced, and will not last under heavy usage.

(3) Present drain valves should be replaced with the standard spigot type drain valve, mounted on the front of the unit. Present drain valves have too many moving parts, each of which is susceptible to the corrosive action of the chemicals.

(4) Squeegee motor should be vented. When the ball bearings in the armature arm get too hot, the grease packing breaks down and the motor is thrown out of balance. As a result, the brushes wear out faster.

(5) Squeegee motor should be installed on a separate switch to avoid unnecessary wear while the processors are warming up.

(6) Transport rollers should be redesigned so that they will remain cool. At present these rollers heat up, causing the paper to stick to them, which in turn causes the paper to bind and tear.

(7) Processors should be mounted on rubber wheels and elevated higher off the floor of the shelter. This would permit more thorough cleaning and maintenance of the equipment.

Observation: Adoption of the above modifications to the EH-48 processor would materially improve its operation and maintainability.

35. (U) Other. None.

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## SECTION 2

## Part II

RECOMMENDATIONS

36. (U) Personnel. None.

37. (C) Operations. It is recommended that:

- a. Air Force tactical reconnaissance squadrons be located at air bases in I and II Corps Tactical Zones to assist in achieving a more responsive aerial reconnaissance system.
- b. This Battalion be provided, at the earliest possible time, with a communications system adequate to insure command and control over Battalion operations, especially during periods of emergency. A letter, subject: MIBARS Communications, was forwarded by this Headquarters, on 8 February 1968, through the MACV J2 Reconnaissance Branch, to the AGofS, Communications - Electronics, Headquarters, USARV, requesting this support.
- c. Multiple coverage imagery be requested over selected targets when a critical need for maximum intelligence exists.
- d. A study be made by this Headquarters to determine the desirability of forwarding selected IR imagery from the PPIF to the MIBARS Detachments to assist in related interpretation work.
- e. Sufficient R&D testing of developmental equipment be conducted in CONUS, and the necessary advance planning for in-country evaluation be made, prior to deployment of the equipment to Vietnam.
- f. The Hand-Held Camera Program be expanded and the value of the utilization of hand-held photography be more widely disseminated. This objective will be met in part by the publication of the Aerial Observer Handbook and Hand-Held Camera Guide. This headquarters is presently conducting a study of the Hand-Held Camera Program, to determine the appropriate courses to pursue in further implementation of the program and to recommend Army-wide standardization of the program.
- g. Further application of the techniques initiated in the Hoi An Sub-Sector to destroy the VC infrastructure be implemented by appropriate agencies.
- h. This Headquarters study the possibility of publishing all data base documents from Cronaflex map masters as a means of providing the most usable intelligence document.

38. (U) Training and Organization. It is recommended that:

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a. Coordination with CONUS major commands be effected by the USARV designated parent organization regarding units programmed for RVN to insure that they are organized under the proper TOE/MTOE prior to arrival in-country.

b. This Headquarters study the feasibility and desirability of establishing a course of instruction for aerial observers at the MIBARS School.

c. 1st MIBARS continue its program of up-dating the imagery and related text of the MIBARS In-Country Imagery Interpretation Key and to publish such other reference aids as may be required.

d. 1st MIBARS continue to ship imagery and related materials to CONUS units and agencies for training purposes.

39. (U) Intelligence. None.

40. (U) Logistics. It is recommended that:

a. The AR-85A Viewer Computer be replaced in the TIIF by an additional imagery interpretation light table AR-90.

b. A flexible connecting passageway be procured to enclose the passage between imagery interpretation vans.

c. The present ES-38 Photographic Darkroom Groups be retained in addition to the new ES-38s programmed to be received by the Battalion.

d. Contact paper #1779 (FSN 6750-664-0327) in 500-foot or 1000-foot rolls be used as a substitute for photographic paper (FSN 6750-597-2636) in 200-foot rolls, when the latter is unavailable.

e. That necessary improvements be made to the EH-48 processor, as discussed in para 34 above.

f. Equipment Improvement Recommendations will be submitted covering recommendations 40a, 40b, and 40c.

41. (U) Other. None.

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as

*J. Walker, Maj*  
J. G. WETHERILL  
LTC, MI  
Commanding

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AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 68)

1st Ind (C)

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(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375      5 MAR 1968

TO: ✓ Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS) (BVCA).

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning communications, page 4, paragraph 10; and page 21, paragraph 37b: Concur with the portion pertaining to tactical radios. 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS) units occupy numerous compounds. During the Tet offensive, telephone communications with many of these compounds were disrupted. In this situation there is a definite requirement for tactical radios to be used as back-up for the common user telephone system. Unit should submit an MTOE request with necessary justification. Non-concur with the requirement for a battalion operations net. The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS) operations are decentralized throughout the four CTZ's. The four lettered MIBARS detachments operate under the de facto operational control of the Corps/Field Force G2 in whose area they are located. Day-to-day operational guidance and priorities for work are established by the G2, not the battalion commander. Under the decentralized mode of operation, this is as it should be. Longer term guidance and policy are established by the commander. However, this guidance can be passed over common user circuits just as it is handled by the other units in RVN whose elements are operating under decentralized operational control. Since all the air reconnaissance liaison officers (ARLO) of the lettered detachments are located at Tan Son Nhut, there is no requirement to establish a MIRBARS operations net, as called for in FM 30-20, to support ARLO operations.

b. Reference item concerning decentralization of Air Force tactical reconnaissance squadrons from Tan Son Nhut Air Base, page 11, paragraph 31; and page 21, paragraph 37a: Concur. FM 30-20, Aerial Surveillance-

GROUP 4

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 68)

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968  
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Reconnaissance, Field Army, states that Air Force reconnaissance squadrons usually operate from fields dispersed throughout the theater of operations. If this were the case in Vietnam, tactical commanders would receive better, more timely reconnaissance support from the Air Force. USARV G2 is conducting a study of this item and will notify 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS) of the results upon completion.

c. Reference item concerning conduct of equipment evaluation programs in Vietnam, page 13; and page 21, paragraph 37e. The comment is valid. If the CONUS agency has particular desires regarding evaluations of its items in RVN, these desires must be made known at an early date in order that proper planning may be accomplished. Any specific testing of an item that does not require the combat environment of RVN should be accomplished in CONUS or other test areas prior to the item being sent to RVN.

d. Reference item concerning the new technique of using hand-held photography to debrief agents, page 15, paragraph 31; and page 21, paragraph 37g: Concur. The details of this procedure will be distributed to USARV units through an article in the USARV Weekly Intelligence and Combat Security Review.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*C. S. Nakatsukasa*  
**C. S. NAKATSUKASA**  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:

HQ 1st MI Bn (ARS)

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GPOP-DT (15 Feb 68) (C) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st MI Bn (ARS) for Period Ending  
31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 APR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding  
endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed, with the following  
additional comments:

a. Reference paragraph 20. It appears that 1st MIBARS is, of necessity, duplicating the training provided at the US Army Imagery Interpreter School. This headquarters agrees that orientation courses are desirable, but 1st MIBARS presents several classes quarterly on each of the following subjects: G2 Air, In-Country Imagery Interpretation, ES-38 Photographic Darkroom, TIIIF, and Hand-Held Camera. The effort to improve the qualifications of personnel is commendable, but the primary problem is the lack of qualified personnel arriving in country. This headquarters recommends that the training base be expanded to provide the necessary qualifications for personnel with MOS 9309 and 96D selected for duty in USARV.

b. Reference paragraph 25. USAEIGHT representatives have revealed an interest in receiving the older ES-38 photo reproduction facilities as they are replaced in RVN. Retention of all ES-38 by 1st MIBARS will probably adversely affect the USAEIGHT photo reproduction capability.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C.L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)  
APO 96307

ORGANIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)  
OPERATING WITHIN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



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Security Classification

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